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I.

BACKGROUND

Two fundamental principles inform our system of justice: the re
lated concepts of notice and the right of parties to be heard by present
ing their full case at a trial on the merits. While notice encompasses
many aspects of a trial or hearing, this discussion focuses on what
constitutes adequate notice to parties when courts seek to control the
shape and conduct of litigation. More specifically, this article ad
dresses the issues surrounding consolidation, the situation that arises
when a court decides the merits of a dispute based solely on the record
produced at a hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction. When
notice of consolidation is absent or inadequate, parties are often de
prived of the opportunity to put their full case before the trier of fact.
In our view, problems associated with consolidating the prelimi
nary hearing with the trial on the merits deserve serious consideration
by the courts and by the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules. We
believe that a rule change is necessitated by current practice in order
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England College School of Law.
n
A.B. 1978, Eisenhower College; M.A. 1981, State University of New York; J.D.
1988, Western New England College School of Law. Associate, Thorn & Gershon, Al
bany, New York.
209

210

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:209

to provide better protection for litigants who find the rules of the game
have been changed without adequate noti<;:e. Lack of notice often
means that parties are forced to engage in cdllaterallitigation, such as
appealing a court's consolidation decision or moving for a new trial,
rather than addressing the merits of their case. Amendments to the
civil rules requiring that actual and adequate notice be given to the
parties by the court, trial or appellate, before consolidation takes place
would reduce unfair prejudice which results when parties are forced to
engage in collateral litigation over procedural problems. Such an
amendment would also be beneficial because it would reduce the bur
den such litigation has on appellate court dockets.
After a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief,l the decision
on the merits may occur in the trial court or on appeal. Because a
preliminary injunction restrains the defendant, the merits should be
addressed as soon as possible. While Rule 65(a)(2)2 gives district
courts the authority to consolidate a hearing on a preliminary injunc
tion motion with the trial on the merits, no such express authority
exists at the appellate level. The lack of a formal notice requirement in
Rule 65(a)(2) and under case law has caused, and continues to cause,
problems for litigants ~nd judges who do not provide adequate notice. 3
More explicit protection is required. In this regard, amendments to
the civil rules are needed.
Failure at the hearing on the preliminary injunction does not dic
tate failure on the merits. As the Supreme Court stated in University
of Texas v. Camenisch,4 a party "is not required to prove his case in
full at a preliminary-injunction hearing."5 Such hearings are charac
teristically marked by the need to show entitlement to an order which
l. For a discussion of the various criteria that federal courts having applied in grant
ing or denying motions for preliminary relief, see generally Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions:
The Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984).
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2) provides:

Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits.
Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a prelimi
nary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be
advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. Even when this
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon an application for a pre
liminary injunction which would be admissable upon the trial on the merits be
comes part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon the trial.
This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to the parties
any rights they may have to trial by jury.
FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2).
3. See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE
DURE § 2950 (1973 & Supp. 1989).
4. 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
5. [d. at 395 (citing Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961)).
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maintains the status quo of the parties. The hearings are often held
under less than ideal conditions because the parties have put together
their cases hastily. Therefore, it is unfair to expect them to develop
fully their claims or defenses on the merits. 6
The Court in Camenisch also instructed that it is a fallacy to as
sume that success or failure at a preliminary injunction hearing is sy
nonymous with ultimate success or failure at trial. Success for the
defendant does not mean that the plaintiff will lose at trial, because the
plaintiff may not have been able to prove irreparable harm at the hear
ing but may still be able to make out a case for relief at trial. More
over, the findings of fact and conclusions of law drawn therefrom "are
not binding at trial on the merits."7 Therefore, as the Court in
Camenisch instructed, "it is generally inappropriate for a federal court
at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the
merits."8
Under current law, the consolidation decisions fall into two broad
categories of cases: express consolidation and "de facto"9 consolida
tion. In the first group are placed those cases in which the district
court, after notice to the parties, combines a hearing on preliminary
relief with a trial on the merits. The "de facto" consolidation cases
include those decisions in which the court, usually (but not always) an
appellate court, reaches the merits, without notice to the parties, based
on the record developed at the preliminary hearing.
To appreciate fully the current law on consolidation, this article
first examines its historical antecedents prior to the 1966 amendment
to Rule 65 giving the district courts express authority to consolidate.
Second, it examines the 1966 amendment to Rule 65 which added sub
division (a)(2). \0 Third, the article discusses the consolidation cases
decided after the 1966 amendment to determine what, if any, changes
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing Industrial Bank of Washington v. Tobriner, 405 F.2d 1321, 1324 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953».
8. Id.
9. We exclude from the category of "de facto" consolidation two other types of
cases: (a) those decisions in which the court purports not to be reaching the merits, but
could reasonably be accused of doing so; see, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Jones, 846
F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting); Paris v. Dep't of Hous.
and Urban Dev., 843 F.2d 561 (1st Cir. 1988) (Bownes, J., dissenting); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); and (b) those deci
sions in which the court states or assumes that the lower court reached the merits when
reasonable persons could disagree with that assumption, see, e.g., Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 593 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. For the text of Rule 65(a)(2), see supra note 2.
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it wrought in the law of consolidation. It concludes with suggestions
for changing current law.

II.

PRE-AMENDMENT PRACTICE

Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 65, the federal courts ap~
peared to take two contrary approaches to the question of whether the
court could address the merits of a case after only a hearing on motion
for a preliminary injunction. Imprecise language and irreconcilable
holdings in Supreme Court cases largely caused the confusion. One
line of cases authorized the federal courts to enter final judgment
(either for plaintiff or defendant) after a preliminary hearing, while the
other line appeared to prohibit it. Each line of decision will be dis
cussed in turn.
A.

Court may decide the merits

Two vintage Supreme Court decisions began this line of prece
dent. In Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,l1 the Court affirmed a judgment
of the court of appeals, which reversed temporary injunction re
straining a patent infringement, and ordered the case dismissed on the
merits. Relying on English and state practice, the Court justified the
dismissal as saving the parties "needless expense"12 if the case were
remanded for a trial on the merits.
Three years later in Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 13 the
Court limited the rule in Smith to cases where the trial court in fact
held "a full hearing,"14 rather than the abbreviated hearing usually
accompanying motions for preliminary injunctions. At the same time,
the Court expanded the rule to include cases: (1) where the bill is "de
void of equity"15 on its face; (2) where the claim is "manifestly"16
without merit; and (3) where the facts are not in dispute. 17 In any of
these instances, the appellate court might resolve the case on the mer
its in defendant's favor even though the case arose on motion for a
preliminary injunction. IS
In 1903, the Supreme Court characterized the practice an
nounced in Mast, Foos as the rule and the three limitations as the "ex

a

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

165 U.S. 518(1897).
Vulcan, 165 U.S. at 524.
177 U.S. 485 (1900).
Mast, Foos, 177 U.S. at 494.
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
Accord, Castner v. Coffman, 178 U.S. 168 (1900).
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ceptions."19 Despite that analysis, the Court acknowledged the
difficulties confronting the complainant at a hearing on a motion for
preliminary relief. The complainant cannot effectively challenge the
defendant's evidence since one cannot cross-examine an affidavit, the
usual mode of proof at hearings for preliminary injunctions. The
Court further recognized that equity complainants should not be re
quired to put on their whole case when seeking only preliminary relief.
If they were, "very few motions of that sort would be made."20 While
that recognition of the realities of hearings for preliminary relief could
have undermined the Mast, Foos rule, the Court nonetheless adhered
to it in later cases. 21 Indeed the Court expanded the rule again a few
years later by permitting appellate courts to address the merits if the
preliminary injunction would cause "grave detriment to the public
interest."22
When the courts have applied the Mast, Foos rule, the result has
generally been a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit with entry ofjudgment
for the defendant. The question arises whether the courts, after a pre
liminary hearing, may apply Mast, Foos against the defendant, enter
ing judgment on the merits for the plaintiff. Despite a contrary
suggestion by the Supreme Court,23 the federal courts have expanded
the Mast, Foos rule to permit entry of judgment for the plaintiff after a
hearing on motion for a preliminary injunction. 24 Indeed within seven
19. Brill v. Peckham Motor Truck and Wheel Co., 189 U.S. 57, 63 (I903).
20. Id. at 63.
21. Accord, Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker,
253 U.S. 136 (1920); Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275 (1917); Leeds & Catlin
Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301 (I909); Harriman v. Northern Sec. Co., 197
U.S. 244 (1905). See also Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913) (extending
to the Supreme Court the rule permitting the circuit court of appeals to reach the merits on
appeal from a deicison regarding a preliminary injunction). Contra, Ex parte National
Enameling and Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906) (Supreme Court cannot reach the merits
unless the circuit court of appeals does).
22. United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 225 U.S. 306, 326 (1912). Accord, Youngs
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (I952) (President Truman's unsuccessful
attempt to seize the steel mills during the Korean conflict); National Ass'n of Farmworkers
Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kansas ex rei. Stephan v. Adams,
608 F.2d 861, 867 n.5 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Spannaus v. Goldschmidt,
445 U.S. 963 (1980).
23. See Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1920). But see
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (I952). In both Sawyer and Thorn
burgh, the Supreme Court, in reviewing rulings on preliminary injunctions, reached the
merits of the disputes and held for the plaintiffs without further discussion.
24. Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. Lopeno Gas Co., 240 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1957);
Allegheny Oil Co. v. Snyder, \06 F. 764 (6th Cir. 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901).
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months of the decision in Mast, Foos, the Sixth Circuit, in Allegheny
Oil Co. v. Snyder,25 upheld the entry of a permanent injunction after
only a hearing on motion for a temporary26 injunction. In Snyder, the
plaintiff sued to enforce a contract for leasing land to drill for oil and
gas. Because "the facts were substantially undisputed,"27 the appellate
court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff. In such instances, the
trial court may reach the merits to save the parties "the expense and
delay of protracted litigation."28
B.

Court may not decide the merits

Despite this plethora of precedent, the Supreme Court has from
time to time read Mast, Foos in a more limited fashion. 29 Occasion
ally, the Court has intimated a disapproval of entering judgment on
the merits prior to a full hearing in the trial court.30 Finally, in Mayo
v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co. ,31 the Court appeared to condemn
altogether the practice of granting judgment for either party before a
full hearing is conducted. In Mayo, grapefruit processing companies
sued Florida state officials to enjoin the enforcement of a statute set
ting prices for citrus fruits. A three-judge district court,32 after hear
ing, entered a temporary injunction, holding the statute
unconstitutional. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the
Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The Supreme Court, on
review of a grant of a preliminary injunction, reached the merits of the dispute and held for
the plaintiffs without further discussion.) See also Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of America,
Inc., 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.) (decided two weeks after the effective date 9f the addition of
subdivision (a)(2) to Rule 65, the court characterized the issue as one of first impression),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
25. 106 F. 764 (6th Cir, 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 618 (1901).
26. Over the years, the courts have used the words "temporary," "preliminary," "in
terlocutory," and "provisional" to describe interim injunctive relief. This article will use
these words interchangeably.
.
27. Snyder, 106 F. at 770.
28. Id.
29. Mewino, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1920) (Mast. Foos
applies only "if it clearly appears that no ground exists for equitable relief"); Eagle Glass &
Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1917) (Mast, Foos applies only if parties consent
to a disposition on the merits or if there is no basis for equitable relief on the face of the
complaint).
30. Ex parte National Enameling and Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906); Brill v.
Peckham Motor Truck and Wheel Co., 189 U.S. 57 (1903).
31. 309 U.S. 310 (1940).
32. In 1976, Congress essentially repealed the three-judge district court mechanism.
Act of August 12, 1976,90 Stat. 1119. See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1333-37 (3d ed. 1988). Congress left the mechanism
in place for apportionment cases, and for certain other matters. Id. at 1334-35 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2284).
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judgment, stating that the lower court should not have reached the
merits on the abbreviated record of the preliminary hearing. It should
only have addressed the factors relating to the propriety of entering a
preliminary injunction.
Prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 65, discussed below, some
lower federal courts took the Mayo approach. In Progress Develop
ment Corp. v. Mitchell,33 for example, the plaintiff companies brought
suit to enjoin town officials from interfering with the construction of
racially integrated housing. In reversing the district judge's entry of
summary judgment for the defendant after a hearing on the plaintiff's
motion for preliminary relief, the court of appeals broadly disapproved
of the practice of reaching the merits on motion for such relief. "No
plaintiff is required to prove his case on the merits at a preliminary
hearing."34 The court stated that the purpose of the abbreviated hear
ing would be defeated if the court addressed the merits since the par
ties would be required to present their whole case. 35

III.

PosT-AMENDMENT PRACTICE

On February 28, 1966, the Supreme Court transmitted to Con
gress amendments to Rule 65, to become effective on July 1, 1966. 36
Among other changes, those amendments added a new subdivision
(a)(2). This provision authorized the trial judge to consolidate the
hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction with the trial on
the merits. In one sense it merely codified in the civil rules a practice
that the Supreme Court had condoned without subdivision (a)(2) at
least since the decision in ¥ast, Foos.J7 The question then is - what
impact, if any, has the new subdivision had on prior practice? The
impact has been mixed. The cases can be classified into two catego
ries: (a) decisions under Rule 65(a)(2); and (b) decisions outside the
rule. Each group will be examined in turn.
33. 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
34. Id. at 233.
35. Accord, Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973); Hoffritz v. United
States, 240 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1956); Seagram-Distillers Corp: v. New Cut Rate Liquors,
221 F.2d 815 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828 (1955); Doeskin Prods. v. United Paper
Co., 195 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1952); Chicago Great W. Ry. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 193
F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1952); cf Tanner Motor Livery v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963).
36. Amendments to Rules o/Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 228 (1966).
37. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900); see also Smith v.
Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897).
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Decisions under Rule 65(a)(2)
1.

History of the Rule

We begin with a brief explanation of how the rule operates. Rule
65(a)(2)38 allows the district court to consolidate the hearing on a pre
liminary injunction with the trial on the merits. In effect this means
that the preliminary hearing becomes the final trial. According to the
Advisory Committee's Note, "[t]he subdivision is believed to reflect
the substance of the best current practice and introduces no novel con
ception."39 Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee's Note makes no
reference to any prior judicial decision or other authority to support
its assertion as to "the best current practice." In fact, as noted above,
the federal courts had taken at least two different approaches. Nor
does the Note explain why one approach is "best."
The purpose of the amendment was to achieve judicial economy
and efficiency where desirable and appropriate. The courts of appeals
have encouraged the use of consolidation under Rule 65(a)(2) to ad
vance the decision on the merits of the controversy and to save time
and expense both at the trial and appellate levels. 40 A court using the
rule can avoid repetition of evidence when the evidence on the prelimi
nary injunction motion will also be important to a decision on the
merits.41
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
thought that such simultaneous consideration of the application for
preliminary relief and of final judgment would provide the party seek
ing relief with a speedier overall remedy.42 However, the consolidated
proceeding should not, in theory at least, cause any "delay in the dis
position of the application for the preliminary injunction, for the evi
dence will be directed in the first instance to that relief, and the
preliminary injunction, if justified by the proof, may be issued in the
course of the consolidated proceedings. "43
38. For the text of Rule 65(a)(2), see supra note 2.
39. Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District
Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 124 (1966).
40. E.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987); Forts v. Ward, 566 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1977); Glen-Arden
Commodities v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1030 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974).
41. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Fed
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (II), 81 HARV. L. REV. 591, 609-10 (1968).
42. Proposed Amendments to Rules, supra note 39, at 124.
43. Id.
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Timing

Rule 65(a)(2) allows the court to order consolidation at any time
"[b]efore or after the commencement" of the hearing on a motion for
preliminary relief. 44 Many judges have interpreted this to mean that
they can consolidate at the end of the hearing as well. 45 In addition
some courts have read the rule to give them the power to consolidate
retroactively.46 That is, after the hearing has concluded, the district
court enters a consolidation order that relates back to the preliminary
hearing and the full trial is merged with the hearing.
In effect, the trial on the merits never takes place because the
consolidation occurs at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing and
effectively bars a trial. This procedure would seem to be in violation of
the spirit of the rule, and "comes perilously close to a violation of due
process."47 The courts, however, have not held such action to be a per
se violation of Rule 65(a)(2). Rather, they balance the trial court's
discretionary power against the degree of prejudice to the complaining
party.48
3.

By motion or own initiative

Consolidation can be ordered by the court on its own initiative49
or by request of either party for such an order. 50 The judge's discre
tion is broad. 51 If consolidation is ordered, Rule 65(a)(2) allows evi
dence already introduced at the hearing to be incorporated in the
record at the trial on the merits. It does not preclude the parties from
44. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2).
45. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Colburn, 531 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1976).
46. Kg., Wohlfahrt v. Memorial Medical Center, 658 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. Unit A
Oct. 1981) (district court denied preliminary hearing on motion for a preliminary injunc
tion); Warehouse Groceries Management v. Sav-U-Warehouse Groceries, 624 F.2d 655
(5th Cir. 1980) (district court denied preliminary relief, issued order consolidating hearing
and trial, and issued final relief); see Update Art v. Modiin Publishing, 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1988).
47. Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603, 606 (4th Cir. 1976).
48. Wohlfahrt, 658 F.2d at 417-18; Dry Creek Lodge v. United States, 515 F.2d 926
(10th Cir. 1975); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter); see John
son v. White, 528 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1975); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d
1096, 1106-07 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. See Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987).
50. K. SINCLAIR, FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 387 (2d ed. 1986).
51. See Glacier Park Foundation v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1981)
("[C]ourt has the power to consolidate . . . . Such action may be taken by stipulation,
motion, or even sua sponte so long as the procedures do not result in prejudice to either
party."); Dillon v. Bay City Constr. Co., 512 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir. 1975).
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reintroducing evidence or testimony at trial if "finer details of proof
are needed on trial than on the preliminary injunction."52
4.

Notice

The rule does not specify what kind of notice, if any, is required
as a prerequisite for consolidation. Consequently, the courts have de
veloped their own standards. Although not unanimous in their ap
proach, they generally have embraced a three-step inquiry. First, has
the district court given any notice at all of its intent to consolidate and
reach the merits? Second, if so, is that notice adequate or sufficient?
Third, if no notice or inadequate notice has been given, has a party (or
parties) been prejudiced by the absence of notice? Some courts have
added a fourth step: Would the omitted evidence change the result of
the decision below?
Although there is no requirement of a formal, written notice of
consolidation,53 "clear and unambiguous notice"54 of the court's in
tention to consolidate must be given. The Supreme Court has adopted
this standard. 55 Thus, a party has grounds to object if it received no
notice or if the notice was inadequate. Most commentators believe
that notice should be adequate so that the parties may present their
respective cases fairly and fully. 56 The focus of "adequate notice"57 is
whether the objecting party has had the opportunity to develop and
present its case. In determining the adequacy of notice, the courts
have considered the period of time between the notice and the consoli
dated hearing, 58 the nature of the case,59 the words used by the judge
52. Kaplan, supra note 41, at 610.
53. H & w Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp:, USA, 860 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir.
1988); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651,652 (5th Cir. 1971) (!fer curiam)
(Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter).
54. Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.
1972). Accord, Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Proimos v. Fair
Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987).
55. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
56. See 19 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION 478 (1983); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, at 486.
57. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988).
58. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern ArapahoeTribe
v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Board of
Trade, 657 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1981); GeHman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976).
59. Without belaboring the obvious, a litigant may need more time to prepare for
trial "in a complicated case" Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988),
than in one less astounding. Compare Michenfelder (five weeks is sufficient time in a pris
oner's suit chaHenging strip searches and use of taser guns) with H & W Industries v.
Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988) (six weeks of discovery is
insufficient time to prepare a breach of contract and antitrust suit).
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purporting to consolidate,60 the opportunity or plans of the party to
undertake discovery,61 and other related factors. The adequacy of the
notice "must be evaluated in light of whether the plaintiff [or defend
ant] would have used the additional time productively."62 Where the
district court entered the consolidation order after the preliminary
hearing and during oral argument, the Fourth Circuit found error. 63
If the objecting party has not received any notice of the court's
intent to decide the merits after a preliminary hearing (so-called "de
facto consolidation"64), or if the notice is inadequate, the courts are
divided as to whether that alone constitutes reversible error.
Although the Supreme Court did not address this point in
Camenisch,65 the lower federal courts have regularly dealt with the
issue, reaching different conclusions. Some courts have adopted the
automatic reversal approach. 66 In Puerto Rican Farm Workers ex rei.
Vidal v. Eatmon,67 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a judgment denying the plaintiff a permanent injunction after
a hearing on its motion for preliminary relief because the district court
failed to notify the plaintiff of its intent to reach the merits. It held
that, under Rule 65(a)(2), the plaintiff is entitled to notice and a trial
on the merits. Courts have reached this result even where the prelimi
nary hearing has produced an extensive record. 68
Similarly, where the district court fails to provide adequate no
tice, some courts have reversed a merit judgment without any showing
of prejudice. In Gellman v. Maryland,69 it was enough that the plain
·60. E.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056-57
(7th Cir. 1972) (inadequate notice of preliminary hearing to "complete" its "total case"
before resting).
61. Northern Arapahoe Tribe v. Hodel, 808 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1987); Gellman v.
Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976); Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg.,
463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972).
62. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988).
63. 'Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976).
64. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 651 F.2d 651, 653 (9th
Cir. 1981).
65. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,395 (1981).
66. Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986); Crowley v. Local No. 82,
679 F.2d 978, 998 n.23 (1st Cir. 1982) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526
(1984); Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976); Penn v. San Juan Hosp., 528
F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975); Puerto Rican Farm Workers ex rei. Vidal v. Eatmon, 427 F.2d
210 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970). See also
Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987).
67. 427 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
68., Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1986); West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1229-30 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. deIJied, 479 U.S. 1070
(1987).
69. 538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976).
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tiff had additional evidence to offer and had been denied the opportu
nity to engage in discovery after the preliminary hearing. The court of
appeals refused to assess the kind and quality of evidence the plaintiff
might later introduce at a merits trial.
In contrast, other courts have held that, even if the district judge
consolidates without any notice or without adequate notice, this will
not result in automatic reversal. Although courts have stated that the
better or preferred practice is for the district court to give notice70 and
to place the response of the parties on the record,11 they have not re
quired it. If the facts are undisputed based on the existing record, if .
the case involves only a question of law, or if the complaining party
fails to show prejudice, the appellate court will affirm the judgment on
the merits even though there has been no trial. First, with regard to
undisputed facts, the Eighth Circuit, in United States ex reI. Goldman
v. Meredith,n found that the preliminary hearing record disclosed "no
conflict of material fact"73 and, thus, entry of final judgment for the
defendant was appropriate even though the plaintiff had not received
adequate notice. Second, the courts have not required notice when the
dispute concerns exclusively questions of law.74 .
Third, if the complaining party fails to demonstrate "prejudice,"
the judgment on the merits will be affirmed. 75 Some courts require the
complaining party to demonstrate "substantial prejudice"76 to its case
caused by the inadequate notice of consolidation. To show prejudice,
the objecting party must prove "how additional evidence could have
70. E.g., United States ex reI. Goldman v. Meredith, 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Goldman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 U.S. 838 (1979);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. FfC, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); Pughs
ley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972).
72. 596 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 U.S. 838 (1979).
73. Id. at 1358.
74. Brotherhood ofRy. Carmen v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 651 F.2d 651, 653 (9th
Cir. 1981).
75. E.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); H & W Industries v.
Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen
County Coop. Beet Growers Ass'n, 725 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984); Paris v. United States
Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983); Commodity Futures Trad
ing Comm'n v. Board of Trade, 657 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1981); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
FfC, 546 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096
(5th Cir. 1972); Nationwide Amusements v. Nattin, 452 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (Fifth Circuit case reported as Fourth Circuit case in Federal Reporter).
76. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 337 (9th Cir. 1988); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096, 1105 (5th Cir. 1972).
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altered the outcome."77 Thus the objecting party must show what evi
dence would have been introduced at trial,78 or what additional dis
covery was required in order for it to p~t on its complete case. 79 In
short, the complaining party must show that it was denied "a full and
complete hearing."8o
Some courts have added a fourth step. In these cases, the appel
late courts evaluate the sufficiency of the additional evidence or dis
covery against the standard for rendering judgment on the merits. 8! If
the additional "proffered evidence"82 is not sufficient to carry the bur
den of proof required to overturn the trial decision, the error is
deemed to be harmless because a remand would be "a useless
gesture. "83
5.

Consent and waiver

The courts have also reached the merits of a controversy after a
preliminary injunction hearing, without formal consolidation under
Rule 65(a)(2), in two additional circumstances: (1) when the parties
consent to the court deciding the merits; and (2) when they waive the
right to notice and opportunity to be heard further on the merits. Nu
merous decisions have noted that formal consolidation is unnecessary
if the parties expressly consent to the district court combining the pre
liminary hearing with the trial. 84
Similarly, courts have found waiver based on the behavior of the
complaining party or parties. Such waiver may occur when the com
plaining party: (1) fails to object when the district judge in fact con
77. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 337.
78. Rosenthal v. Carr, 614 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980).
79. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court ordered
consolidation five weeks before trial and seven weeks after the action commenced; addi
tional time would not have helped the plaintiff prepare any more thoroughly). Compare
Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983)
(judge consolidated just before adjourning the preliminary hearing, thus cutting short
plaintiff's discovery).
80. H & W Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172, 178 (5th Cir.
1988).
81. Reese Publishing Co. v. Hampton Int'l Communications, 620 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1980).
82. Berry v. Bean, 796 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1986). See also Socialist Workers
Party v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 566 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (after the
defendant's evidentiary hearing, court found that such facts would not alter the result),
aff'd 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
83. Berry v. Bean, 796 F.2d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 1986).
84. Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987); Pughsley v.
3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); Puerto Rican Farm
Workers ex reL Vidal v. Eatmon, 427 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1970).
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solidates in the presence of the parties;85 or (2) files a post-hearing
brief and proposed order which assume a disposition on the merits. 86
Finally, in Channel Home Centers v. Grossman,87 the plaintiff objected
to the district court's failure to give advance notice of consolidation.
When the judge offered to permit the plaintiff to introduce additional
evidence at a second hearing, the plaintiff declined because it first
wanted more discovery. The court of appeals held that this consti
tuted a waiver of any defect under Rule 65(a)(2) because the plaintiff
never asked for additional discovery or more time to prepare.
6.

Jury trial

The rule also protects the parties' right to jury trial. It directs
that "subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as to save to
the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury."88 Thus, when a
party requests a jury trial, evidence already heard at the hearing may
be reintroduced for the benefit of the jury, even if repetitious, because
reading the record from the preliminary hearing to the jury may not
be realistic. 89 Often critical testimony of prior witnesses may require
that the jury observe the demeanor of the witness in order to deter
mine how much weight to give the testimony.
The parties will probably also want to reintroduce evidence
presented in affidavits and depositions at the hearing after consolida
tion takes place. Similarly, if the consolidated trial is to be held before
a different judge, the parties have the right to reintroduce evidence
presented at the hearing. 9o Finally, after consolidation, the party who
has demanded a jury trial may inadvertently lose that right since the
court is now hearing the case on the merits without a jury.91 Courts
85. DeLeon v. Susquehanna Community School Dist., 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1984);
Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974).
86. Fenstermacher v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); see Paris
v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1983). But cf.
Woe by Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's request for a permanent
injunction in its post-hearing brief does not constitute a waiver by defendant).
87. 795 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986). See National Ass'n of Farmworkers Orgs. v. Mar
shall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (parties consented on appeal to a decision on the
merits); cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 n.21 (11th Cir. 1983)
(parties did not consent on appeal to consolidating preliminary relief with merits). Contra,
Di Giorgio v. Causey, 488 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1973) (parties' agreement on appeal to reach
merits is not sufficient basis for court to do so); Doeskin Prods. v. United Paper Co., 195
F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1952) (same).
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2) (last sentence).
89. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 36, at 122.
90. Id.
91. Cf. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
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have been quite sensitive to this concern, and have reversed merits
judgments that appeared to trench upon a litigant's right to jury
trial.92 The remedy is for the court to revoke the consolidation order,
postponing the trial on the merits, or to impanel a jury to find the
facts.
.
7.

Continuance

The rule is silent about continuance and time for additional dis
covery. Parties involved in preliminary injunction hearings are usu
ally rushed by the need to prepare for the hearing. Thus,
consolidation may work a real hardship if the judge is unwilling to
grant additional time for discovery and case development. In some
instances the trial judge has told the parties they must put on their full
cases immediately and has denied requests for additional time for
discovery.93
8.

Summary judgment

In other instances, courts have used rulings in the nature of sum
mary judgment whereby plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunc
tion is denied and other legal or equitable relief prayed for is also
denied or granted. 94 When district courts do this, they are not afford
iQg the parties the procedural safeguards of either motions to dismiss
under Rule 12 or summary judgment under Rule 56. 95 In one case, a
judge even fashioned permanent relief after the close of the prelimi
nary injunction hearing while the case was on appea1. 96 He did so
based on the hearing record, pleadings, and affidavits. He .simply or
dered the parties to court, informed them that he had consolidated,
and issued his final order on the merits.97
92. H & W Industries v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 860 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1988);
Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. Pughsley v. 3750 Lakeshore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972).
94. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
95. Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) and motions for summary judgment under
Rule 56 are ordinarily made in writing prior to a hearing. FED. R. CIv. P. 7(b). The
federal rules generally require five days notice of the hearing on the motion. FED. R. CIv.
P. 6(d). If the motion is for summary judgment, ten days notice is required. FED. R. CIv.
P. 56(c). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment may obtain discovery if
needed to prepare counter-affidavits. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f).
96. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, 460 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1972).
97. Id. at 1096.
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Decisions Outside Rule 65(a)(2)

Analytically, the "consolidation" decisions under and outside
Rule 65(a)(2) raise identical concerns regarding the disposition of
cases on the merits after only an abbreviated hearing on a motion for
preliminary relief. Despite the addition of subdivision (a)(2) to Rule
65 in 1966, the federal courts continue to decide cases on the merits,
without reference to Rule 65(a)(2), after only a preliminary hearing.
These decisions outside the rule probably persist in the jurispru
dence of injunction law because (1) they trace their history to prece
dents antedating by at least sixty years the amendment tQ Rule 65; and
(2) they arise largely, although not entirely, in the appellate courts
hearing appeals from judgments granting or denying preliminary in
junctions. Although Rule 65(a)(2) is technically applicable only in the
United States district courts,98 the concerns underlying the rule should
guide the appellate courts as well. In an analogous context, the
Supreme Court has noted: "Although the Federal Rules of Civil Pro
cedure strictly apply only in the district courts ... the policies inform
ing [them] may apply equally to the courts of appeals."99 Indeed the
Supreme Court has on occasion applied the civil rules to cases before
it. 100
Like their counterparts prior to the Rule 65 amendment, the deci
sions after the amendment take two disparate approaches. One line of
cases, which dates at least to Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning
Co. ,101 appears to prohibit decisions on the merits after only a prelimi
nary hearing. The second line of precedents, permitting such "de
facto consolidation," is more hoary, dating to cases decided at the tum
of the century. 102
The progeny of Mayo are numerous in the post-1966 period.
Although the courts do not always refer specifically to Mayo, they
nonetheless faithfully apply its rationale. The essence of Mayo is that
the parties at a hearing on motion for preliminary relief do not have
sufficient time or opportunity to prepare their cases fully. Such hear
ings are regularly conducted on the papers, including affidavits, depo
sitions, exhibits, and other documentary proof.. The inability to
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
99. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218, 2223 (1989) (in fact
the Court approved the application of those precise policies in the court of appeals).
100. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (applicability of Rule 21 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to cases pending in the Supreme Court).
101. 309 U.S. 310 (1940). See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
102. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900); Smith v. Vulcan
Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897).
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conduct extensive discovery is another limiting factor. The abbrevi
ated nature of the proceeding makes it a poor vehicle for exploring the
merits of the controversy. Thus, it is not surprising that in Withrow v.
Larkin 103 the Supreme Court chastised a lower federal court for de
claring a state statute unconstitutional after only a preliminary hear
ing. While relying on Mayo, the Court did not refer either to Rule
65(a)(2) or the Mast, FODs line.
A few years later, the Supreme Court, even more emphatically,
underscored the importance of not deciding the merits solely on the
basis of a hearing on motion for preliminary relief. In 1981 the Court
decided University of Texas v. Camenisch,I04 which in some respects
represents the intersection of the rule and non-rule lines of decision.
Camenisch, a deaf college student, commenced a civil action against
the University of Texas under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.105 He claimed that the University violated the Act because it
refused to pay for a sign language interpreter. The plaintiff moved for
and the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the
University to pay for an interpreter until a decision on the merits.
While the case was on appeal from the grant of the injunction,
Camenisch graduated from the University. As a consequence, he
claimed in the Supreme Court that the case was moot, while the de
fendant asserted it was still alive because Camenisch had posted a
$3,000 bond as a condition of the preliminary injunction. In effect the
defendant was asking the Court to address the merits of the dispute to
determine if Camenisch should be liable under the bond for its pay
ments to the interpreter.
The Supreme Court agreed with Cameni~ch that the case was
moot, but only as to the propriety of the preliminary injunction. It
held that the security bond for the injunction operated to keep the
merits alive, but not the preliminary relief. The Court stated, how
ever, that "it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the pre
liminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the merits."106
103. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-26 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Walters v. Na
tional Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,601-04 (1984) (B1ackmun, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973) ("this Court may only consider" the
matters going to the issuance of the preliminary injunction).
104. 451 U.S. 390 (1981). Of course, the doctrinal antecedent of Camenisch goes
back at least to Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940). See supra
notes 31-35 and accompanying text. The Court never cited Mayo in Camenisch.
105. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
106. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. See also Thornburgh v. American College of Ob
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Because of the limited purpose and nature of the preliminary hearing,
a party "is not required to prove his case in flJll" 107 at that stage of the
proceedings. The Court noted, however, that consolidation proce
dures under Rule 65(a)(2) authorize the district court judge to com
bine the preliminary hearing with a trial on the merits, suggesting that
approach as the exclusive mode of proceeding. A number of lower
federal courts have followed this line of reasoning. !Os
In contrast with the Larkin-Camenisch line is the other group of
precedents in which the Supreme Court and other federal courts have
reached the merits although the cases arose on motions for prelimi
nary relief. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gy
necologists 109 is the leading case after the 1966 amendment adding
subdivision (a)(2) to Rule 65. In Thornburgh the plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act. The
district court issued very limited preliminary relief, which the Court of
Appeals expanded considerably in holding major portions of the stat
ute unconstitutional.
Without any reference to Rule 65(a)(2), the Supreme Court held
that appellate courts (and logically trial courts as well) may dispose of
a case on the merits even though the record was developed on motion
for a preliminary injunction. The Court stated that the normal rule
articulated in Camenisch is not "inflexible" 110 or a limitation on "judi
cial power,"lll Courts may address the merits if the case rests
"solely" on questions of law and if "the facts are established or of no
stetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814-26 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Wai
ters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 601-04 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973) ("this Court may
only consider" the matters going to the issuance of the preliminary injunction).
107. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395.
108. Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1986) (en bane),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Thournir v. Buchanan, 710 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983);
West Point-Pepperell v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 953 n.l (11th Cir. 1982); Brooks v.
Nacrelli, 415 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1969).
109. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305 (1985); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
110. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756. Two years before Thornburgh, the Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that Camenisch was not "an insurmounta
ble bar" to an appellate court deciding the merits on review of a preliminary injunction
motion. West Virginia Ass'n of Community Health Centers v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570,
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
111. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757. See Mercury Motor Express v. Brinke, 475 F.2d
1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973) (rule limiting appellate review to issues of the preliminary in
junction, not the merits, "is one of orderly judicial administration and not a limit on juris
dictional power"). See also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
(1985).
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controlling relevance."112 Relying on the Smith 113 and Sawyerl14 de
cisions, the Court stated that such a practice is calculated "to save the
parties the expense of further litigation." 115
In a sharp and vigorous dissent, Justice O'Connor,116 relying on
Camenisch, criticized the majority for prematurely deciding "serious
constitutional questions on an inadequate record."ll7 In Thornburgh,
she noted, the district court conducted the usual abbreviated hearing
for preliminary relief, consisting of affidavits, stipulated facts, oral ar
gument, and legal memoranda. Justice O'Connor complained that the
defendants did not have the opportunity "to develop facts that might
have a bearing on the constitutionality of the statute."1l8 The defend
ants, she observed, stipulated to facts in the district court only for the
purpose of the decision on the preliminary injunction motion. If the
majority view prevails, she stated, future parties will convert the pre
liminary hearing into a full trial on the merits for fear that the court
will decide the merits without giving adequate opportunity to present
their entire case. This will make litigation "more expensive, less relia
ble, and less fair.""9
112. Thornburgh, 476 u.s. at 757.
113. Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518 (1897). Reliance on Smith is some
what misplaced since the Court itself has described Smith as having been decided after "a
full hearing ... upon pleadings and proofs." "Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177
U.S. 485, 494 (1900). As Justice O'Connor pointed out dissenting in Thornburgh, the dis
trict court did not conduct a full hearing in the Thornburgh case. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at
815-26.
114. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Reliance on
Sawyer may also be misplaced since that case arose under "highly unusual circumstances,"
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 822 (O'Connor, J., dissenting): President Truman had seized the
steel mills, the Government did not object to a merits decision, the steel companies affirma
tively wanted it, and time was of the essence.
115. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 756.
116. Justice O'Connor appears to be the only member of the current Court who has
taken a consistent position on this issue, whether she is in the majority or in dissent. The
other justices appear to ignore or embrace Camenisch depending on whether the majority
of the court accepts or rejects their view on the merits. For example, Justice Blackmun
essentially ignored Camenisch writing for the majority in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 755-56,
but embraced it when dissenting in Stotts, 467 U.S. at 601-04. Similarly, Justice Brennan
joined Justice Blackmun in Thornburgh, but relied heavily on Camenisch dissenting in WaI
ters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 338-58 (1985). Justice Rehn
quist wrote for the Court in Walters, ignoring Camenisch, but embraced it dissenting with
Justice O'Connor in Thornburgh. Lastly, Justice White, disregarding Camenisch, spoke for
the majority in Stotts, but adopted Camenisch dissenting in Thornburg. Similar observa
tions may be made of the other justices by examining their voting patterns in Camenisch,
Stotts, Walters, and Thornburgh. A foolish consistency, as Emerson once wrote, may very
well be the hobglobin of little minds and law review articles.
117. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 815.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 826.
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Lower federal courts have, like the Thornburgh Court, reached
the merits of cases after a preliminary heariI)g without regard to Rule
65(a)(2). They have, however, adopted various approaches to that in
quiry. The courts have decided the merits in the following circum
stances: (1) where the dispute, as in Thornburgh, presents only legal
questions and the facts are not in dispute; 120 (2) where the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;121 (3) where
the record is fully developed, the legal issues are obvious, and immedi
ate resolution of the merits is needed; 122 and (4) where the record is
fully developed and the dispute turns largely on legal questions. 123 As
in the period prior to the amendment to Rule 65(a)(2), the majority of
cases have involved entry of judgment for the defendant, although a
few, such as Thornburgh itself, have ruled for the plaintiff on the
merits. 124

IV.
A.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Introduction

Although more than two decades have passed since the 1966
amendment to Rule 65(a)(2) expressly authorized consolidation, con
fusion over when consolidation is proper still exists. The problems
identified in this article suggest the need for reform. The following
proposals are addressed to both trial and appellate practice. They are
designed to ensure that parties receive notice of consolidation and
have full opportunity to object. More importantly, they are designed
to ensure that all parties have a full and fair opportunity to present
120. West Allis Memorial Hosp. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1988); Faheem-El
v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287
n.6 (11th Cir. 1985); Otero Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275
(10th Cir. 1981); Montano v. Lefkowitz, 575 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1978). See also Socialist
Workers Party v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 566 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
aff'd 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
121. American Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Laboratories, 800 F.2d 306, 310 (2d
Cir. 1986) (where the claims are "utterly without merit"); Friarton Estates Corp. v. City of
New York, 681 F.2d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 1982) (where the complaint has "no equity");
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc) (where there is "no
merit to the complaint whatever"); Lee v. Ply*Gem Indus., 593 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
122. South Carolina ex rei. Tindal v.. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. de
nied, 465 U.S. 1080 (1984).
123. New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d
1376 (9th Cir. 1987).
.
124. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1987); National Ass'n of
Farmworkers Orgs. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hurwitz v. Directors
Guild of America, 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.) (decided two weeks after the effective date of the
1966 amendment to Rule 65), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
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their case on the merits, either at the preliminary injunction hearing or
at the trial. We first present current Rule 65(a)(2) followed by a sug
gested amendment. We then propose a comparable amendment to re
form appellate practice for the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court.
B.

Current Rule 65(a)(2)
Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits.
Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application
for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the
action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hear
ing of the application. Even when this consolidation is not ordered,
any evidence received upon an application for a preliminary injunc
tion which would be admissible upon the trial on the merits be
comes part of the record on the trial and need not be repeated upon
the trial. This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied
as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury. 125

C.

Proposed Amendments
1.

Amendment to Rule 65(a)(2)

Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits.
(i) At any time during the pendency of a motion for a prelimi
nary injunction, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, .
may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and
consolidated with the hearing on the motion. Prior to the entry of
such order, the court shall give cleat and unambiguous notice of the
proposed order to every ·party. Unless expressly. waived in open
court, every party shall be afforded adequate time to object in writ
ing to the proposed order. The court. may order consolidation only
if the objecting party has had a full and fair opportunity for discov
ery and to present to the court the factual and legal materials in
support of its case on the merits. The court shall enter into the
record its reasons for ordering ·consolidation.
(ii) An order consolidating the hearing and trial shall not oper
ate to delay the granting or denial of preliminary relief. Even when
consolidation is not ordered, any evidence received upon a motion
for a preliminary injunction which would be admissible at the trial
on the merits becomes part of the record for such trial and need not
be readmitted.
125.

FED. R. elv. P. 65(a)(2).
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(iii) This subdivision (a)(2) shall be so construed and applied as
to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury.

2.

Amendment to Appellate Practice 126

Whenever an appeal is taken pursuant to Section 1292(a)(1) or
otherwise, the court of appeals, upon motion or upon its own initia
tive, may enter an order stating its intention to decide the case on
the merits. Prior to the entry of such order, the court shall give
clear and unambiguous notice of the proposed order to every party
to the action. Unless expressly waived in open court or in writing,
every party to the action shall be afforded adequate time to object in
writing to the proposed order. The court may enter such an order
only if the objecting party has had a full and fair opportunity to
present its factual and legal materials in support of its case on the
merits to the district court or the court of appeals. The court of
appeals shall enter into the record its reasons for the order. This
subdivision shall be so construed and applied as to save to the par
ties any rights they may have to trial by jury.

D.

Discussion

The proposed changes take into account a number of factors and
seek to address the apparent reasons for the types of misapplication of
the current rule discussed above. The most important change is the
one requiring a court to provide adequate notice to the parties. Re
quiring that the court provide the parties with clear and unambiguous
notice of consolidation conforms with the most widely cited standard
employed by the federal courts of appeals. 127 The proposed amend
ments adopt this standard of notice because it ensures that the parties
know what the court contemplates; that is, it ensures that the parties
understand the procedural setting in which they are operating. Any
thing more might needlessly hamstring the court. A formal notice re
quirement, such as one mandating that ten days before consolidation
takes place the parties be served with a written order, would not serve
the ends of a preliminary injunction remedy, nor would such a formal
notice requirement provide the flexibility required to deal with prelim
inary injunctions. The reason for only requiring that notice be ade
126. This amendment is proposed as a new subdivision to 28 U'.S.C. § 1292 or as an
addition to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. A comparable amendment should
also govern practice in the United States Supreme Court.
127. See, e.g., Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d \055, \055
57 (7th Cir. 1972).
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quate is simply to ensure that the parties know what is expected of
them in terms of case presentation.
When it appears to the parties that the notice afforded to them by
the court does not provide adequate time for full case development
and presentation, the suggested amendments, which include an ex
plicit procedure for objection, would provide the protection which is
now lacking. A party who feels that consolidation will work prejudice
because of the pressures of obtaining or defending against a prelimi
nary injunction would have the power to object at this point without
resorting to additional procedural litigation. A party could request
time to prepare the objection. Faced with a proposed order of consoli
dation, a party could object, either orally or in writing, so that the
district court would know the basis for the objection.
It must be remembered that it is the trial which is being expe
dited, and some parties may not have even begun to prepare for trial.
They may need time for discovery or to find witnesses. Should a party
come forward and show that consolidation is prejudicial because it
forces that party to address issues it is not yet prepared to litigate, the
court should continue to conduct the hearing and wait to consolidate
at a later time. The proposal allows the court to order consolidation
over objection but only "if the objecting party has had a full and fair
opportunity to present to the court the factual and legal materials in
support of its case on the merits." As a further safeguard against arbi
trary action, the proposal requires the district judge to "enter into the
record its reasons for ordering consolidation."
These provisions should make it clear that any doubts which the
court may have should be resolved in favor of the objecting party. A
court should never consolidate after refusing to hear proffered evi
dence or before inquiring what further evidence a party contemplates
adducing at trial. The objection provision of the propqsal is intended
to avoid the problems encountered in a case like Dillon v. Bay City
Construction Co. 128 where the district court refused to hear new evi
dence and refused to allow more time for discovery after counsel ob
jected to consolidation. 129
The proposed revision would also make it clear to the federal
courts that retroactive consolidation should never work to deprive
parties of the opportunity to present their case at trial. Retroactive
consolidation is, in effect, summary judgment without the procedural
128.
129.

512 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 803.
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protections of Rule 56. 130 It is premised on the often mistaken belief
that the issues litigated at a preliminary injunction hearing are identi
cal to those litigated at the trial. The recognition of the right to object
should prevent this aberrant form of summary judgment from occur
ring because courts would have to give notice before deciding the mer
its. Such a notice requirement avoids the problems found in Woe by
Woe v. Cuomo, 131 where the defendant held back evidence and, in fact,
did not put on a case at the hearing because defense counsel expected
to introduce their case at a trial on the merits. Under the proposed
amendment, parties whose litigation strategy was to concede the pre
liminary injunction and resist vigorously the final relief would not find
themselves surprised by an after-hearing consolidation order coupled
with final judgment.
The objection provision, in conjunction with the notice provision,
allows the court to test its perception of the case against that of the
parties. This is important because, although the issue at the hearing is
not the same as at trial, frequently the evidence offered at the prelimi
nary hearing bears on issues to be decided at trial. The proposed
amendments would prevent the trial court from losing sight of the fun
damental difference between issues litigated at a preliminary hearing
and those litigated at a trial on the merits. \32 For example, in a case
like Gellman v. Maryland,133 the proposed change could have pre
vented the prejudice to plaintiff in the trial court by forbidding the
district judge to consolidate without notice and opportunity to be
heard by the parties.
In Gellman, the plaintiff Gellman had obtained a temporary re
straining order pursuant to Rule 65(b). Gellman was seeking to enjoin
Morgan State College in Baltimore, Maryland, from engaging in al
leged acts of racial discrimination. 134 At the conclusion of the hearing
on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court consoli
dated the hearing with the trial. \35 Plaintiff's counsel objected vocifer
ously to the consolidation. Counsel informed the court that she had
prepared only for the preliminary hearing and that the plaintiff had yet
to engage in discovery. Furthermore, counsel for Gellman informed
the court that she had evidence to present that was pertinent to the
merits, but had not offered it because her understanding was that the
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Gellman v. Maryland, 538 F.2d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 1976).
801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986).
See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981).
538 F.2d 603 (4th Cir. 1976).
/d. at 604.
Id.
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hearing was on a preliminary injunction motion. 136
If Gellman's counsel had been forced to come forward with evi
dence or with reasons why it was not possible to go forward with a
consolidated trial, then the court would have been in a better position
to judge whether Gellman's claim was frivolous' or without factual
support. Only after giving Gellman this opportunity would it have
been proper to render a final judgment. If the court felt that the evi
dence introduced at the hearing was insufficient to support a finding at
trial for plaintiff, a proposed consolidation order would have helped
determine if the court's perception was on target. The modification of
Rule 65(a)(2) would make it clear to district courts that the rule was
not intended to provide the means for judges to dispose unfairly of
litigation in a summary manner. The rule was intended to save time
and money by permitting courts to incorporate the preliminary pro
ceedings into the trial on the merits by eliminating repetition of
evidence.
The modification would continue the present flexibility afforded
the district courts. For instance, if a court felt it did not have sufficient
evidence at the preliminary stage to render relief, it could consolidate
the hearing and trial. One commentator would require even more ex
tensive evidentiary hearings and oral argument before issuing a pre
liminary injunction.137 The feeling is that the current standards for
issuance of an injunction do not afford the defendant enough protec
tion. The proposed amendment would allow a court this kind of flexi
bility while making it clear that consolidation should not
unnecessarily prevent or slow down the granting of preliminary relief.
Finally, this change, which would require clear and unambiguous
notice and the opportunity to object in a formalized fashion, would
insure that there is a record of the proceedings. This is important be
cause the era of the "managerial judge" 138 is here to stay. Creating a
record thus prevents the possibility for misunderstanding and abuse
which is possible under the rule as currently worded. It would compel
judges, on the record, to consult with the parties before ordering con
136.

Id.

137. Since interlocutory problems arise from the need to grant or deny relief on
what may prove a mistaken view of the parties' rights, the court should consider
ways of making its preliminary appraisal more accurate. The simplest way of
doing this is to expedite the final hearing when necessary to avoid thorny prelimi
nary issues.... Even without moving to a final hearing, the court can give fuller
attention to the merits by allowing oral testimony and briefing the counsel in fit
cases.
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 556 (1978).
138. See generally Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
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solidation. A public record of the consolidation procedure protects
the parties from "managerial judging," the "less visible and actually
unreviewable" method of docket management that writers have criti
cized as giving "trial courts more authority ... with fewer procedural
safeguards to protect [litigants] from abuse of that authority."139
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has identified some of the more flagrant abuses that
trial and appellate courts have committed in reaching the merits after
only a hearing on a motion for preliminary relief. Rule 65(a)(2), as
currently worded and as interpreted by the courts, is not providing the
safeguards required by a system in which judges play an active role.
As the pressures on judges increase to settle litigation, to weed out
frivolous claims, and to move other claims quickly through the sys
tem, parties must not be subject to ad hoc, expedient procedural
decisions.
The proposed amendments outlined above would serve both
courts and parties. They would prevent the kind of abuses discussed
in this article by requiring that the parties be informed of the proce
dural setting in which the court intends to operate. They would also
afford the parties the opportunity to object to a consolidation order in
much the same way as parties do when faced with a summary judg
ment motion. The provisions would insure that due process is pro
vided and that parties have the chance to present all the evidence they
plan to introduce. The proposed amendments are also designed to
avoid tying the hands of the courts. While the judges may still play an
active role in litigation, the proposed changes clarify what that role
should be by adding specific procedures to govern a disposition on the
merits after only a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

139.

Id. at 380.

